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NATIONAL INSECURITY: ITAR AND THE
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPAIRMENT OF
U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
JASON A. CROOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE EARLY YEARS of the sixteenth century, a war for eco-
nomic supremacy broke out between the European powers vy-
ing for control of the Asiatic trade routes. Central to this
struggle for economic domination was the possession of highly-
sensitive navigational logs called rutters, which provided sailors
with detailed information about the depth measurements, com-
pass headings, and wind conditions one could use to survive the
perilous oceanic crossing to reach the untold riches of the Far
East.' Possession of these rutters was such a closely-guarded
matter of national security that, as described by Clavell, "by [Por-
tuguese] law any foreigner caught in possession of any rutter of
theirs, let alone one that unlock[ed] the Magellan, [was] to be
put to death at once. And if the rutter [was] found aboard an
enemy ship, the ship [was] to be burned and all aboard exe-
cuted without mercy. '"2
Although modern data protection methods are considerably
less dramatic, the underlying principle of state control over cer-
tain types of information and technology impacting the national
interest still remains alive and well. In the field of commercial
space activity this control is particularly evident since
"[s] pacecraft, including communications satellites, remote sens-
* Mr. Crook is a former staff aide to the Honorable Bart Gordon, Chairman of
the House Committee on Science and Technology, and the author of Corporate-
Sovereign Symbiosis: Wilson v. ImageSat International, Shareholders' Actions, and the
Dualistic Nature of State-Owned Corporations and From the Civil War to the War on
Teror: The Evolution and Application of the State Secrets Privilege.
1 JOHN CLARKE, CLARKE's BIBLIOTHECA LEGUM 341 (1819). "The Rutter of the
sea, [containing] the havens, rodes, soundings, kennyngs, wyndes, floads, and
ebbas, danngers, and coasts of divers regions . Id.
2 JAMES CLAVELL, SHOGUN 35 (1975).
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ing satellites, scientific satellites, research satellites, navigation
satellites, [arid] experimental and multi-mission satellites" all
fall under the regulatory auspices of the Arms Export Control
Act, even if specifically intended for civilian use.' While there is
a strong argument that this regulatory regime has impeded the
competitive ability of the U.S. aerospace industry,4 there is an
equally strong argument that it has impeded the implementa-
tion of U.S. space policy as well.
To address this secondary argument, this article will consider
the present state of the International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions as they relate to the United States' current space policy.
Part I will provide a cursory overview of the export control re-
gimes that exist at the national and supranational levels. Part II
will discuss the historical development and modern focus of U.S.
national space policy. Part III will analyze the practical impact
these regulations are having in the civil and academic research
environments. Part IV will identify solutions policymakers could
adopt to achieve sensible security. Finally, Part V will offer con-
cluding thoughts about reconciling America's security interests
with its commitment to space exploration.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXPORT
CONTROL REGULATIONS
Before delving into the technical intricacies of the arms ex-
port control protocols, it is important to first have an under-
standing of the different national and supranational regimes
that impact the transfer of U.S. space technology. In the open-
ing section of the Arms Export Control Act, Congress states that
[i] n furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign pol-
icy of the United States, the President is authorized to control
the import and the export of defense articles and defense ser-
vices and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the
United States involved in the export and import of such articles
and services.5
3 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(c), Category XV(a) (2008).
4 See generally Mike N. Gold, Lost in Space: A Practitioner's First-Hand Perspective on
Reforming the U.S. 's Obsolete, Arrogant, and Counterproductive Export Control Regime for
Space Related Systems and Technologies, 34 J. SPACE L. 163 (2008).
5 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (a) (1) (2006). Respecting "defense services," this language
was inserted
to regulate training of foreign militaries in part as a result of the
actions of former CIA officer Edmund Wilson, who worked for Lib-
yan President Qaddafi by providing training to Libyan military and
intelligence forces. The U.S. had few authorities to regulate Wil-
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As part of this responsibility, "[t]he President is authorized to
designate those items which shall be considered as defense arti-
cles and defense services for the purposes of this section and to
promulgate regulations for the import and export of such arti-
cles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the
United States Munitions List."6
By Executive Order 11,958, the President "delegated his
rulemaking authority [under the Arms Export Control Act] to
the Secretary of State . . . who has promulgated the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR").'"' "These regula-
tions contain the United States Munitions List ... a categorical
list of 'defense articles' that cannot be exported without first ob-
taining a license from the Department of State."8 Among the
items specifically enumerated on this list are combat shotguns,
nuclear warheads, nerve gas, and, perhaps anticlimactically, nav-
igation satellites.9 Any party seeking to export or facilitate the
export of an item on this list to a party outside the United States
must first obtain the proper permission from the State Depart-
ment's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls before the trans-
action can proceed.10
As noted by John R. Liebman and Kevin J. Lombardo, "the
intended use of the article or service after its export (i.e., for a
military or civilian purpose) is not relevant in determining
whether the article or service is subject to ITAR controls; the
product's capability is the controlling concern."11 While ITAR
does not control "general scientific, mathematical, or engineer-
ing principles commonly taught in schools.., or information in
son's activities because the transfers did not involve U.S.-origin de-
fense articles and were conducted outside the U.S.
John P. Barker, Brokering Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, in Cop-
INC WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2008 181, 185 (2008).
6 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).
7 United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2004).
8 Id.
9 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.
10 John R. Liebman & Kevin J. Lombardo, A Guide to Export Controls for the Non-
Specialist, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 501 (2006). Here it is to be
noted that an "export" does not simply refer to the transfer of an item outside the
territory of the United States, but can also refer more broadly to the sharing of
information with a foreign citizen-even if the conversation takes place at a se-
cured location inside the United States. See MARTY HAUSER & MICAH WALTER
RANGE, ITAR AND THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRY 11 (2008), http://www.spacefounda-
tion.org/docs/SpaceFoundationITAR.pdf.
I See Liebman & Lombardo, supra note 10, at 503.
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the public domain, "12 it does control the transmission of infor-
mation "required for the design, development, production,
manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance
or modification of defense articles... [including] information
in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plains, instruc-
tions or documentation."' 3
One of the unique features of this enforcement regime is the
reliance "on the business community to apply rigorous self-clas-
sification procedures to determine whether a given commodity
or technology is subject to ITAR export controls.'14 For items or
services which defy easy classification, ITAR "also sets forth a
procedure that the exporter may invoke to obtain a 'commodity
jurisdiction' (CJ) determination from [the Department of] State
in cases of doubt."'5 While this refers to the procedure "used to
determine whether an item or service is subject to export licens-
ing authority [by] either [the Department of] State or Com-
merce," each licensing path is heavily dependent upon
corporate self-regulation. 16
At the supranational level, the United States is also a party to
the Wassenaar Arrangement (Arrangement), a multilateral pro-
tocol designed to "contribute to regional and international se-
curity and stability, by promoting transparency and greater
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies."'17 Even if a particular good or service
might normally be exported from the United States without its
exporter having to obtain a license, "special export controls"
may nevertheless prohibit this free transfer if the export is cov-
ered by the Arrangement or the Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative.' 8 This latter protocol applies to "the export of goods
or the rendition of services to end-users or to countries who are
known to present risks in terms of the proliferation of chemical
12 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2008).
13 § 120.10(a)(1).
14 See Liebman & Lombardo, supra note 10, at 505.
15 Id.
16 Id. The Department of Commerce uses Export Administration Regulations,
or EARs, to control the exportation of commercial or "dual-use" commodities not
purely military in function. Id. at 506. The effectiveness of this self-regulating
system is due, in part, to the massive civil and criminal penalties that a company
or individual can incur in the event of an arms export control violation. See 15
C.F.R. § 764.3 (2008).
17 See Wassenaar Arrangement, Arrangement Introduction, http://www.was-
senaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
Is See Liebman & Lombardo, supra note 10, at 511.
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and biological weapons, missiles, and nuclear weaponry," while
the Wassenaar Arrangement, as stated before, is a multilateral
program that restricts the transfer of certain items by its mem-
ber states.19
The implementation of the Wassenaar Arrangement owes its
historical development and geopolitical purpose to the tactical
realities of the Cold War. In the post-World War II era, "the
United States and its allies implemented a new system of unilat-
eral and multilateral export controls designed chiefly to prevent
communist acquisition of Western military goods and technol-
ogy. ' 20 Central to this mission was the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a group of nations
who sought to control the proliferation of certain types of sensi-
tive technology. 21 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s, COCOM was disbanded "due to its inability to meet
the new post-Cold War demands. 22
In place of this Cold War entity, a new multilateral framework
was designed under the Wassenaar Arrangement that "could si-
multaneously control the spread of sensitive technologies while
fostering the ability of the United States to export and maintain
its share of the global technology market. '23 Even though "the
scope of export controls in Participating States is determined by
[Wassenaar Arrangement] lists, practical implementation varies
from country to country in accordance with national proce-
dures. '24 The United States, Slovenia, and Japan might all regu-
late the export of a particular space technology under the
auspices of the Wassenaar Arrangement, yet each could take a
completely different approach to doing so.
Given ITAR's fundamental purpose as the domestic means of
protecting the nation's technology while also fostering "world
peace and ... security,"25 it can be somewhat unclear at first as
to why this seemingly-beneficial export regime is so pernicious.
To understand the controversy which ITAR produces and the
logistical challenges it can provoke, it is useful to consider the
19 Id. In practice, this operates much like an international version of the
United States Munitions List.
20 Kenneth A. Dursht, From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and the
Wassenaar Arrangement, 19 CARnozo L. REv. 1079, 1079 (1997).
21 Id. at 1080.
22 Id. at 1081.
23 Id.
24 See Wassenaar Arrangement, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.was-
senaar.org/faq/index.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
25 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1) (2006).
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historical events which have impacted the development of the
current ITAR regime as it relates to the transfer of space tech-
nology. "During the Cold War, the policy of the United States
was that all exports of space-related goods and technologies
[would] be regulated by the State Department as munitions."26
Because "the United States and the Soviet Union used space
technology as a means of demonstrating technological superior-
ity and as a means of keeping watch over each other's military
assets," this policy made sense from a national security perspec-
tive.27 As the Cold War began to wind down, however, "U.S.
companies saw an opportunity to expand their business and
they lobbied the government to ease some of the restrictions
that were in place. "28
In 1988, the U.S. government "lifted the ban on the use of
Chinese launch vehicles for commercial satellites," an action
which allowed American businesses to "take advantage of signifi-
cantly lower launch prices."29 Four years later, a presidential de-
cree "ordered the removal of dual-use items from the USML
unless they posed a clear danger to national security. '30 After
several trade associations pointed out that the United States was
the only nation that treated such satellites as munitions, the
State Department "transferred jurisdiction of some commercial
communications satellites to the Department of Commerce in
1992, provided that the satellites did not exceed certain techni-
cal specifications that would make them 'military-grade. ' ' 31
This transfer of jurisdiction was completed by October 1996,
and from 1996 through 1999, commercial communications
satellites and certain ancillary items were regulated by the De-
partment of Commerce through the Commerce Control List in-
stead of the State Department's ITAR regime.32  This
arrangement "put U.S. export controls in accord with those of
the EU, Japan, and other Wassenaar Arrangement members
which treat[ed] commercial satellites and related items as
predominantly commercial items subject to less stringent export






32 KARL W. ABENDSCHEIN & CORINNE C.JORGENSON, THE GLOBAL EXPLORATION
STRATEGy: LEGAL PERSPECrIvES 5 (2008) (on file with author).
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controls than those imposed on Munitions List items."33 This
arrangement changed in 1998, however, when:
U.S. Congressional investigations discovered that [in] 1996
Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications ille-
gally transferred technology to China that may have improved
the capabilities of China's intercontinental ballistic missiles. The
assistance was provided in the wake of the February 1996 Intelsat
708 launch failure .... In response to the investigations and
their conclusions the House and Senate, in Section 1513 of the
1999 National Defense Authorization Act, transferred jurisdic-
tion over commercial satellites and satellite components exports
from the Commerce Department to the State Department, and
tightened restrictions on transferring U.S. made satellites, satel-
lite components, equipment, and technical information (e.g.,
launch failure analysis) to foreign customers. 4
In the wake of this scandal and Congress's reallocation of
much of the national enforcement regime's responsibilities to
the State Department, it has become evident that much of the
criticism ITAR receives stems from the practical mechanics of its
operation as opposed to the objective it seeks to advance. Un-
like other items included on the United States Munitions List,
space systems and launches are subject to heightened security
requirements which place a considerably greater compliance
cost on parties seeking to conduct space-related operations. 5
As U.S. policy currently states,
[t]he export of any satellite or related item . . . or any defense
service controlled by this subchapter associated with the launch
in, or by nationals of, a country that is not a member of [NATO]
or a major non-NATO ally of the United States always requires
special exports controls, in addition to other export controls re-
quired by [ITAR].3 6
Among the additional export control requirements ITAR cur-
rently demands for space-related activities, parties must submit
"a technology transfer control plan (TTCP) approved by the De-
partment of Defense and an encryption technology control plan
approved by the National Security Agency. '3 7 They must also
"make arrangements with the Department of Defense for moni-
toring [with] [t]he costs of such monitoring services [to] be
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See 22 C.F.R. § 124.15 (2008).
36 § 124.15(a) (emphasis added).
37 § 124.15(a) (1).
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fully reimbursed to the Department of Defense by the U.S. per-
son receiving such services."38 "Technical discussions and activi-
ties, including the design, development, operation,
maintenance, modification, and repair of satellites" must all be
monitored, as must any "satellite . . . launch[ing] activities, in-
cluding launch preparation, satellite transportation, integration
of the satellite with the launch vehicle, testing and checkout
prior to launch, . . . and return of equipment to the United
States."
39
In a survey conducted by the Space Foundation in 2007 ask-
ing U.S. companies whether ITAR in its present form protected
the national security interests of the United States, only ten per-
cent of respondents believed that it did not.4" As the Space
Foundation's report noted, "[t]his corresponds closely with a
2006 survey of executives in the broader aerospace and defense
community, which revealed that two out of three believed that
the export control system effectively protected U.S. national se-
curity interests."4 1 In this same survey, however, nearly seventy
percent of respondents indicated that ITAR was responsible for
some amount of delay in technical assistance and support and
nearly seventy-five percent reported similar delays for marketing
and sales.42 While the majority of the U.S. space industry ap-
pears to recognize that "there are valid national security con-
cerns with regard to space technology that ITAR is trying to
protect," these same businesses also maintain that the export
control process "is not fully protecting the interests of the
United States because it is damaging the health of the space in-
dustrial base."43 Because "foreign firms do not have to deal with
38 § 124.15(a) (2).
39 Id. As noted by Mike Gold of Bigelow Aerospace, the monitoring require-
ments foisted upon space actors can often result in bizarre practices such as the
24-hour guarding of the Genesis I stand which, if "placed upside down [and]
covered with a nice checkered tablecloth" would resemble a metal coffee table.
Gold, supra note 4, at 172.
40 See HAUSER & RANGE, supra note 10, at 3.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 4.
43 Id. at 3. Here the Space Foundation noted that
[a] large prime contractor is likely to have an entire department of
staff working on ITAR compliance for the company as a whole, and
these people have the experience necessary to handle any space-
related ITAR paperwork. By contrast, second- and third-tier suppli-
ers are more likely to be at a disadvantage as they may not have the
personnel to ensure that everything is being done in accordance
with ITAR. The proportional cost of ensuring compliance is much
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an equivalent set of export regulations," many businesses believe
that "[ITAR] gives [foreign businesses] a competitive advantage
in the global marketplace" which American companies simply
cannot match.44 These businesses argue that this regulatory dis-
parity potentially "reduces the competitiveness of [the U.S.]
space industry in the global market and potentially harms the
domestic innovation processes that enable U.S. space
leadership. 1 45
III. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF U.S. SPACE POLICY
With the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the world's first artificial
satellite, on October 4, 1957, the United States experienced "a
national concern that [it] was falling behind the USSR in its sci-
ence and technology capabilities and thus might be vulnerable
to a nuclear missile attack. The resulting competition for scien-
tific and technological superiority came to represent a competi-
tion between capitalism and communism."46 Spurred to action
by the military realities of this ideological struggle, within ten
months after Sputnik's launch, Congress and the Eisenhower
Administration took action to establish NASA, the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and to reform the
elementary and post-secondary education curriculum to include
a greater emphasis on science, technology, and engineering.4 7
Nearly ten years to the day after Sputnik's launch, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union entered into
a "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies. 4*8 Commonly known as the Outer
Space Treaty, this agreement placed a significant measure of im-
portance on multilateral cooperation in the post-World War II
higher for them, up to eight times that of a first-tier supplier, and
this is a significant concern since many lower-tier suppliers have
relatively small profit margins.
Id. at 7.
- Id. at 4.
45 Id. at 1.
46 DEBORAH D. STINE, U.S. CIXqLIAN SPACE POLICY PinoRITIES: REFLECTIONS 50
YEARS AFTER SPUTNIK 2, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (June 20, 2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108077.pdf.
47 Id. at 3.
48 Stephen Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political,
Moral or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 390, 392 n.11 (1972).
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era. 9 As the treaty's preamble states in part, " [d]esiring to con-
tribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as
well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer
space" and "[b] elieving that such cooperation will contribute to
the development of mutual understanding and to the strength-
ening of friendly relations," the State Parties to the Treaty
agreed to certain cooperative provisions.50
Such an emphasis on international cooperation still remains
an overriding theme in U.S. space policy. In the 2004 report of
the President's Commission on Implementation of United
States Space Exploration Policy, the Commission observed that
"[i] nternational talents and technologies will be of significant
value in successfully implementing the space exploration vi-
sion," with the recommendation that "NASA pursue interna-
tional partnerships based upon an architecture that would
encourage global investment in support of the vision."'" Two
years later in President Bush's August 31, 2006 declaration of
U.S. National Space Policy, the United States further committed
itself to "seek to cooperate with other nations in the peaceful
use of outer space to extend the benefits of space, enhance
space exploration, and to protect and promote freedom around
the world," while also working to "[e] ncourage international co-
operation with foreign nations and/or consortia on space activi-
ties that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful
exploration and use of space, as well as to advance national se-
curity, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives. ' 52 To
accomplish these goals, the Secretary of State was directed to
take the lead in "carry[ing] out diplomatic and public diplo-
macy efforts ... to encourage the use of U.S. space capabilities
and systems by friends and allies. '53
In contrast to this principal theme of working to ensure inter-
national cooperation and the achievement of common goals,
the same document also appears to introduce a stumbling block
to this objective. While stating that "[a]s a guideline, space-re-
49 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S.,
Soviet Union, U.K., Preamble, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
50 Id.
51 President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Explora-
tion Policy, A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover 9 (2004), http://www.
nasa.gov/pdf/60736mainM2M-report-small.pdf.
52 U.S. National Space Policy (Unclassified) 1-2 (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.
nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/2006NationaSpacePolicy.htm.
53 Id. at 7.
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lated exports that are currently available or are planned to be
available in the global marketplace shall be considered favora-
bly," the policy went on to state further in the same paragraph
that
[e]xports of sensitive or advanced technical data, systems, tech-
nologies, and components, shall be approved only rarely, on a
case-by-case basis. These items include systems engineering and
systems integration capabilities and techniques or enabling com-
ponents or technologies with capabilities significantly better than
those achievable by current or near-term foreign systems. 54
While the United States had committed itself to encouraging in-
ternational cooperation and the use of American space capabili-
ties by friendly foreign nations, it also affirmed that, in some
cases, the underlying technology used to support these endeav-
ors was to remain a "rarely" shared secret. 55
IV. CASE STUDIES
In a clear example of how one aspect of national policy can
quickly impede another, talks between the United States and
the governments comprising the European Space Agency (ESA)
recently broke down due to European concerns that U.S. tech-
nology transfer laws would prove too restrictive to effectively
permit a Mars rover joint-development program to succeed.56
As Daniel Sacotte, head of ESA's Human Spaceflight program,
was quoted as saying, "[i]t's a shame, but it's not for me to com-
ment on U.S. law, only to note its effects, and for the rover,
54 Id. at 9.
55 It is unclear from a reading of the Policy whether this "approved only rarely"
language is meant to apply strictly to military-grade technologies or to certain
civilian articles as well. Viewing Part 12 in its entirety, the first sentence declaring
that "space-related exports that are currently available or are planned to be avail-
able in the global marketplace shall be considered favorably" can arguably be
read as encouraging the export of items-whether military or civilian-which
could already be purchased on the open market. This could be because there is
no perceived harm in transferring technology to foreign partners if it could just
as easily be acquired from another open-market source. Looking to the "sensitive
or advanced" sentence, however, this would seem to preclude the export of
American technology for either civilian or military purposes if it is of a type not
commonly available for open market purchase. Given that many space-related
exports could by their very nature be classified as sensitive or advanced, the dis-
tinction between the two policies articulated in Part 12 seems to hinge on
whether the technology is currently available in the open market, as opposed to
whether it meets a particular "sensitive" threshold. See id.
56 Peter de Selding, ESA Looks East for Future Space Cooperation, SPACE NEws, May
30, 2005, http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday-050530.html.
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ITAR would have made cooperation too complicated to be feasi-
ble. 57 The article also notes that the ESA "is gradually coming
to the conclusion that the U.S. legal regime known as ITAR...
will foreclose whole categories of trans-Atlantic cooperative ef-
forts in space exploration. 58
As chilling as this effect on international cooperation in the
particular instance might be, there is an additional danger that
the ITAR regime will preclude the United States from engaging
in other nationally-beneficial ventures. Quoting Sacotte, "[w]e
are now obliged to develop our autonomy in various areas,
which is no bad thing. We are fully capable in Europe of devel-
oping these technologies. We may also find partners besides
NASA."5 In the context of future developments, many Euro-
pean officials believe that Europe
cannot limit [itself] to subcontractor work by one or another
company that may or may not continue through develop-
ment .... NASA has always excluded international partners from
significant work shares on a program like the Crew Exploration
Vehicle. We expect that to remain the case. That is why we are
looking toward Russia and Japan [instead] for a joint
program." 60
In a similar challenge to the U.S. National Space Policy objec-
tives, critics have also blamed ITAR for slowing down the collab-
oration necessary to finish the International Space Station.
Given that "ITAR regulations require U.S. contractors to obtain
what is known as a Technical Assistance Agreement, or TAA, to
share controlled information and technology with non-U.S. citi-
zens," important communication between American and Euro-
pean contractors has often been delayed.61 "ITAR restrictions
have caused inefficiencies and have been a distraction to train-
ing and ATV [Automated Transfer Vehicle] procedure develop-
ment," according to one government official, simply because the
restrictions "[make] it difficult to get information on each
other's systems that [U.S. and European contractors] need to





61 Brian Berger & Peter B. de Selding, ITAR Complicates Preparations for New





These impediments are particularly galling to many European
officials "who contend their cooperation with NASA on the in-
ternational space station program is already covered by the in-
tergovernmental agreement the space station partners signed in
September 1988, and a nearly identical document signed a dec-
ade later in June 1998 following Russia's entry into the partner-
ship. 63 Compounding the challenge even further is the lack of
a "standard TAA form that is crafted at the State or Defense
departments. TAAs are written by companies individually and
reflect the companies' occasionally worst-case assessment of the
risks, resulting in the most restrictive language possible. 64 Be-
cause of its cumbersome approval process and lack of standardi-
zation, "'[y]ou will get 10 TAAs from 10 different companies,
and there are often substantial differences between them,' ....
Any modification to a TAA can take months to make its way
through State and Defense, even if the modification is only to
change an address .... 6
In a May 26, 2000 letter to Senator Jeff Bingaman, Charles
Kruger of Stanford University articulated many of the challenges
the ITAR regime presents to other institutions, such as schools
and universities engaging in collaborative research and develop-
ment projects.66 Since two of the "fundamental goals" of U.S.
Space Policy are to "[i] ncrease the benefits of civil exploration
[and] scientific discovery," while also allowing "a robust science
and technology base" to develop,67 the restrictions imposed by
ITAR can, once again, be seen as impeding a direct governmen-
tal policy objective:
Just one sentence [invoking ITAR] . . .was all it took to ban a
Stanford graduate student, who is Chinese, from continuing his
work with basic spacecraft control algorithms. It was enough to
prevent the world's expert in proton monitors, who is Irish, from
being in the same room as the equipment he designed when
American researchers bolted it onto a satellite. It prevented the
signing of a contract that would allow Japanese, Stanford and
Lockheed researchers to collaborate in studying the sun. One




66 Letter from Charles Kruger, Vice Provost and Dean of Research and Gradu-
ate Policy, Stanford Univ., to Senator Jeff Bingaman, United States Senate (May
26, 2000), available at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/DoR/C-Res/itar-letter.
html [hereinafter Kruger].
67 See U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 52, at 2.
5172009]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
patterns at universities including Stanford, Caltech, Penn State,
MIT and the Universities of California, Arizona and Colorado.6"
Providing another illustration of the hurdles ITAR can impose
on the American scientific community, Kruger then referenced
the case of a Chinese student who "wrote software for a long-
standing NASA basic physics project" designed to test Einstein's
theory of relativity.69 This project was "not~intended for and
could not be put to military use [and] all of the information and
technology surrounding the scientific equipment [was] in the
public domain. "70 Nevertheless, when "[t] he researcher sent his
software to NASA for their review... NASA stamped the report
and the software 'ITAR-controlled' and insisted that the individ-
ual who wrote it now need [ed] an export license to review it." 7 1
In a third example of how ITAR can place significant eco-
nomic restrictions on universities conducting important scien-
tific research, Kruger also outlined the challenges of securing
launch capability for one of the school's most basic satellite re-
search projects:
One of our doctoral students built a small satellite as his thesis
project, using technology in the public domain and parts pur-
chased at a local commercial electronics shop. Unable to obtain
launch space with a private company or on a NASA vehicle, the
student enterprisingly looked for another provider. Ultimately,
the Baumann Space Center at the University of Moscow offered
to let the student put his satellite on their rocket launch without
charge. However, ITAR as presently worded appears to preclude
this type of cooperation, notwithstanding the fact that the satel-
lite is neither suitable nor intended for any military use. This
student has not yet secured a launch and therefore cannot test
his project. It would cost the university $500,000 to $2,000,000 to
secure a private launch for the satellite.72
Imposing such heavy costs on the academic community diverts
much-needed resources away from critical areas of research and
development, and can thus be seen as directly impeding the de-
velopment of the "robust science and technology base" articu-
lated as a goal of the U.S. National Space Policy.73





73 See U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 52, at 2.
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Notable as these examples are, however, the burden imposed
on the nation's commercial space industry is even more striking.
In an August 21, 2008 article appearing in The Economist, it was
pointed out that
[p] rime contractors, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, can
absorb ITAR's costs as part of doing business. But the second-
tier contractors that support them and the third-tier component
suppliers are having much more trouble. The burden of compli-
ance on [these] component-makers was nearly 8% of foreign
sales in 2006."M
Left unchecked, "the Pentagon fears it may have to start buying
satellite components overseas" simply because ITAR will have fi-
nancially crippled America's innovative science and technology
base.75
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of ITAR's current model
and method of implementation is the cumulative effect this re-
gime might have on the United States' national security objec-
tives. In a hearing conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on
Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, Dr. Frederick A.
Tarantino of the Universities Space Research Association
testified:
Space is strategic for many nations, and we are in the midst of a
massive internationalization of it. In 2005, China became the
third nation to fly a human in space. European Space Agency
nations, Japan, China, Russia, and India are all resourcing and
planning major long-range space science programs, including lu-
nar and planetary missions. China is developing a robotic nu-
clear-powered lunar rover as the second phase of their lunar
program. Japan and China sent probes (Kaguya and Chang'e-1)
to the moon in 2007, and India's launch of Chadrayaan-1 is
scheduled for 2008. While the U.S. scientific community is re-
stricted in its foreign collaborations under International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), ESA is collaborating extensively
with China, India, and Japan in their lunar explorations. A hesi-
tant approach to exploration will cede U.S. supremacy in space
to other nations.
74 Space Technology: Earthbound, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2008, available at http://
www. economist. com/displaystory. cfm ? story-id =11965352 [hereinafter ECONO-
MIST].
75 Id.
76 Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Dr.
Frederick A. Tarantino, CEO and President University Space Research Associa-
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Given the explicit policy recognition that " [i] n this new century,
those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity
and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those
who do not" and that " [i] n order to increase knowledge, discov-
ery, economic prosperity, and to enhance National security, the
United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space ca-
pabilities," 77 a "hesitant approach" that "cede[s] U.S. supremacy
in space to other nations" may very well cost the United States its
technological lead while also jeopardizing its security.78 As the
National Academics' Committee on Prospering in the Global
Economy of the 21st Century wrote, "We fear the abruptness
with which a lead in science and technology can be lost-and
the difficulty of recovering a lead once lost, if indeed it can be
regained at all."'79
V. ACHIEVING SENSIBLE SECURITY
While the prospects of reforming ITAR might initially appear
to be somewhat daunting, it is nevertheless possible to have a
security regime that protects American technology while also
meeting the stated objectives of U.S. National Space Policy.
Even though the objectives of "international cooperation with
foreign nations"s0 and "advanc[ing] national security"'' might
appear to be inherently incompatible in the context of sharing
advanced technology, ITAR does not have to be an impediment
to U.S. National Space Policy if it is reformed in the correct way.
First, it is important for policymakers to acknowledge the
technological and geopolitical realities of the post-Cold War
world. As noted by George Abbey and Neal Lane in a report
prepared for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences:
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
competed with one another, both on earth and in space; today,
the two nations are working together. In November of 2001 ...
Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at Rice University. In his
tion), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/TarantinoUSRA
WrittenTestimony.pdf.
77 NASA Exploration Programs: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Space and Aero-
nautics, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of RichardJ. Gilbrech, Associate Adminis-
trator Exploration Systems Directorate National Aeronautics and Space
Administration), available at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=
27549.
78 See Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration, supra note 76.
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speech, he said, "We have long . . . been cooperating in [the]
space exploration field. And the creation, the establishment of
the international space station is [an] 85 percent bilateral Rus-
sian-American project." The space station is an excellent exam-
ple of international cooperation, not only between two Cold War
adversaries, but also among sixteen nations around the world-
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, It-
aly, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United States, and the United Kingdom.82
With such widespread international cooperation taking place to
achieve large-scale common objectives, "the United States
should recognize that space is no longer dominated by two
world powers. Rather, it is an international domain of com-
merce, science and exploration, environmental monitoring, and
understanding. The laws of physics work just as well in Manda-
rin as in English."83
The second important development that American policy-
makers must acknowledge is the increase in the number of
countries which have developed-or are rapidly developing-an
indigenous space industrial community. As Daniel Sacotte of
the European Space Agency remarked in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Mars rover joint-development negotiations, "[w] e
are now obliged to develop our autonomy in various areas,
which is no bad thing. We are fully capable in Europe of devel-
oping these technologies. We may also find partners besides
NASA."'84 Rather than fostering an environment in which NASA
and American businesses can work to satisfy the needs of foreign
partners, ITAR has instead created a strong incentive for foreign
nations to develop their own industries at America's expense.
As Abbey and Lane observed in their report:
In the past, U.S. companies frequently prevailed in international
competition, as the international industry considered American
technologies superior and American satellites more reliable than
those manufactured by other nations. Today, because of export
control regulations, U.S. companies find themselves at a serious
competitive disadvantage .... Based on Satellite Industry Associ-
ation data, the U.S. share of global satellite sales plummeted
from 64 percent of the $12.4 billion market in 1998 to 36 percent
82 GEORGE ABBEY & NEAL LANE, UNITED STATES SPACE POLICY: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 6 (2005), available at http://www.amacad.org/publications/space
policy.pdf.
83 Id.
84 See de Selding, supra note 56.
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in 2002. Foreign customers, even from allied nations, are unwill-
ing to purchase satellites from U.S. manufacturers when they
face restrictions on the acquisition of technical and test data and
operating information on their purchased satellite, as well as sig-
nificant delays in obtaining approvals. Indeed the costs, delays,
and complications that accompany the use of U.S. components
in satellites built by other companies in other nations are so no-
torious that certain European manufacturers have begun adver-
tising their products as "ITAR free" to attract customers.8 5
In one of the clearest examples of ITAR's counterproductive in-
centives, the report notes that "ESA and CNES [(Centre Na-
tional d'Etudes Spatiales)] have also embarked on a $33.4
million program called the European Component Initiative,
which will develop production lines for systems that are critical
to satellites and currently available only from U.S. companies." 6
In view of these two developments, there are a variety of modi-
fications government policymakers can introduce into ITAR and
the export control process that will allow American entities-
both public and private-to effectively interface with global
partners while also maintaining U.S. national security. Given
that most of the objections to ITAR focus on its practical imple-
mentation instead of its substantive ideology,87 simple principles
of organizational efficiency could be employed to improve the
program's effectiveness while also alleviating many of its sources
of current criticism.
First, by creating a standardized Technical Assistance Agree-
ment (TAA) form outlining the level of transfer risks the gov-
ernment deems appropriate, the State Department could take
much of the "worst case scenario" guess-work out of the TAA
drafting process.88 By introducing a measure of uniformity into
this area, the government could avoid the problem of having
"10 TAAs from 10 different companies," with "substantial differ-
ences between them,' 89 and instead move to a transfer regime
that offers greater predictability to foreign partners. Since "ESA
has been asked to sign a number of TAAs by U.S. companies...
[that] contain language that ESA cannot accept" and consider-
85 See ABBEY & LANE, supra note 82, at 10.
86 Id.
87 See U.S. National Space Policy, supra note 52, at 2.
88 This could operate much like an SEC "no-action" letter in which the Com-
mission informs the requesting party that it will not regard a particular activity as
a violation of the U.S. securities laws.
89 See Berger & de Selding, supra note 61.
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ing "that some U.S. companies draft TAAs that presume to su-
persede ESA's immunity from certain U.S. laws," providing a
standardized TAA form to American exporters would offer as-
surance that they are operating in compliance with U.S. restric-
tions while also addressing some of the sovereign immunity
concerns that foreign partners might raise.9" The cost savings
many smaller companies would experience through the reduc-
tion in legal fees required to draft these documents would also
be a substantial benefit.
A second reform policymakers could consider is the adoption
of an end-user licensing system for certain allied nations, instead
of a transaction-by-transaction approval process. As the Space
Foundation noted in its recommendations on ITAR and the
U.S. Space Industry:
If wars in the future are to be multilateral affairs, it is essential for
the U.S. military to achieve interoperability with the forces sup-
plied by allied nations. The battlefield is the worst place to ac-
complish this task; it is safer for the troops if they are prepared
beforehand to work with their allies when the time comes. Ide-
ally,... the equipment of U.S. allies [would be] compatible with
U.S. space systems or at least capable of being easily adapted for
interoperability. 9
By entering into bilateral export agreements with trusted allies
such as Australia and the United Kingdom, the United States
could streamline the ITAR approval process so that joint mis-
sions like the Mars rover and the International Space Station
take place in a much more cooperative atmosphere. Since the
State Department approved 99% of the more than 8,000 li-
censes requested by these two nations in 2007, the practical na-
ture of these relationships would not be affected, but the
process for interacting with them would certainly be
streamlined.9 2
Additionally, adopting an end-user system for ITAR approval
instead of a transaction-based model would allow
close U.S. allies [to] have prompt access to the equipment and
support they need to engage in future coalition [and scientific]
operations. Companies and agencies would be able to perform
the same tasks that they are already doing, but in a more timely
90 Id.
91 See HAUSER & RANGE, supra note 10, at 5.
92 Id.
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and efficient manner, which increases the likelihood of under-
taking more projects of mutual benefit.93
Such an approach would also comport with previous U.S. prac-
tice since "cooperation with NASA on the international space
station program is already covered by the intergovernmental
agreement the space station partners signed in September 1988
"94
A final recommendation worthy of consideration is the trans-
fer of certain dual-use satellite technologies away from the
United States Munitions List and onto the Commerce Depart-
ment's Commerce Control List or some similar regulatory
schema. By classifying these items accordingly, the United
States would place its "export controls in accord with those of
the EU, Japan, and other Wassenaar Arrangement members
which treat commercial satellites and related items as predomi-
nantly commercial items subject to less stringent export controls
than those imposed on Munitions List items. '95 In recognition
of the overall goal of export control policy-preventing hostile
parties from acquiring sensitive technology-the United States
should "define the categories of goods and technical knowledge
more clearly and appropriately" so that a more responsive pro-
tection regime can be established. 96
By "assess[ing] the current state of military technology and
determin[ing] what is inappropriate for export," the United
States' control regime could more effectively
take into account the availability of spacecraft components on
the global market so as not to prevent U.S. companies from sell-
ing goods that could have been purchased from a foreign com-
petitor . . . the list of controlled items should be narrowed
significantly to include only the parts of a spacecraft that can
truly be said to be sensitive technology.97
Given that export controls also
apply to people, including scientists and graduate students, as
well as technologies and products[,] [a]mbiguity in the regula-
tions and a slow and cumbersome process of review and approval
can hinder progress for research scientists . . .and government
93 Id.
94 See Berger & de Selding, supra note 61.
95 See ABENDSCGHIN & JORGENSON, supra note 32.




laboratories .... The United States, long the world leader in
most fields of space science, engineering, and technology,
could retain its leadership position simply by periodically evalu-
ating what technology is truly sensitive. 8
VI. CONCLUSION
As PresidentJohn F. Kennedy once said, "l[t] he exploration of
space will go ahead, whether we join in it or not, and it is one of
the great adventures of all time, and no nation which expects to
be the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in the
race for space."9 Such sentiments ring especially true nearly
fifty years later, as the United States struggles to retain its posi-
tion of technological leadership as it continues to use an export
control regime which directly impedes the growth and develop-
ment of the U.S. space program. While there is no shortage of
information indicating the effect ITAR has had on the commer-
cial space industry, there is an increasing body of evidence that
these same policies are also impeding the official goals and
objectives of the U.S. National Space Policy. If international co-
operation and the advancement of a robust science and technol-
ogy base are to be achieved, ITAR must be reformed to permit
greater information-sharing with trusted partners and allies.
As mentioned throughout this article, much of the opposition
that ITAR currently faces could be alleviated by removing many
of the "special export controls" that are specifically directed to-
ward the space community. Is it really necessary for NASA to
have to reimburse the Department of Defense for the cost of
monitoring its activities with the European Union when these
activities take place inside a NASA facility? Should the United
States really be in the business of guarding non-essential items,
such as Bigelow Aerospace's "metal coffee table," when the
proliferation of such technology has absolutely no sensitive im-
pact on the national interest? Given that every dollar spent on
ITAR compliance is a dollar that is unavailable for advancing
research and development, the current cost regime can easily be
seen as a direct budgetary transfer from one government agency
to another without any demonstrable benefit.
98 See ABBEY & LANE, supra note 82, at 11.
99 John F. Kennedy, Address at Rice University on the Nation's Space Effort
(Sept. 12, 1962), http://www.jfldibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+His-
tory/Space+Program.htm (follow "Address at Rice University" hyperlink).
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Even if certain specialized export controls are needed for the
space community, the manner in which these controls are im-
plemented could go a long way toward enhancing the willing-
ness of international partners to cooperate with the United
States. Given that ESA and other space agencies like CNES are
still conducting research missions-albeit without the United
States-and an increasing number of nations are developing
"ITAR-free" space industries to draw international customers
away from U.S. contractors, the current arms control regime, if
left unreformed, will continue to undermine the security objec-
tives articulated in the U.S. National Space Policy. Is the na-
tional interest truly served when the Pentagon fears it will have
to eventually purchase satellite components from non-American
sources simply because there will not be any American busi-
nesses left to supply them?100 Will the United States have
achieved greater technological security when many of its space-
related programs are outsourced to foreign countries for com-
pletion? Given the laudatory purpose ITAR seeks to serve, it
would be highly unfortunate for a program designed to protect
the nation's security to be responsible for helping undermine it.
100 See ECONOMIST, supra note 74.
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